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*  This Article provides comments on a paper by Dina Francesca Haynes, Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ní 
Aoláin, presented at the Santa Clara Journal of International Law Symposium, Emerging Issues in 
International Humanitarian Law. 
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I.  Introduction 
The authors of Women in the Post-Conflict Process: Reviewing the Impact of Recent U.N. 
Actions in Achieving Gender Centrality1 have produced a compelling paper that is likely to 
have a significant impact on the way that scholars and activists conceive of their goals and 
accomplishments in post-conflict settings. The paper, and the book that forms its foundation,2 
offer a reconceptualization of the appropriate breadth and focus of transitional justice work. 
The paper has the potential to change how we approach the process of rebuilding 
communities torn apart by conflict and to produce real improvement in the lives of women 
(and men) who feel the impact of those conflicts in their daily lives. 
The Haynes, Cahn, and Aoláin paper assesses the extent to which recent U.N. Security 
Council resolutions have increased opportunities for women to meaningfully participate in 
post-conflict processes.3 The paper addresses several key themes, including: (1) the 
importance of a realistic assessment of the impact of U.N. Security Council Resolution (SCR) 
1325 and its progeny;4 (2) the notion of gender centrality as a more effective and compelling 
scholarly framework and advocacy strategy than gender mainstreaming;5 and (3) the 
difference between rhetorically valuing women’s participation in peace-building processes and 
actually affording women a meaningful opportunity to participate in peace building, including 
high-level formal processes. Most importantly in this regard, the paper offers guidance in how 
to close the gap between rhetorical and actual commitment—namely, through the strategic 
use of programmatic funding and partnership agreements to ensure that partners implement 
a broad gender and security agenda.6 
The last two decades have witnessed significant advances in our recognition and 
understanding of the brutality with which women are targeted and victimized in armed 
conflict across the globe. There has been widespread acceptance of the notion that women 
have a crucial role to play in the aftermath of armed conflict. Within the world of 
international criminal law, there has been a growing recognition of the need to hold 
perpetrators accountable for rape and sexual violence in the context of armed conflict.7 These 
                                                                                                                               
 1. Dina Francesca Haynes, Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Women in the Post-Conflict Process: 
Reviewing the Impact of Recent U.N. Actions in Achieving Gender Centrality, 11 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 189 (2012) [hereinafter Women in the Post-Conflict Process]. 
 2. FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, DINA FRANCESCA HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, 
WAR, AND THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS (2011) [hereinafter ON THE FRONTLINES]. 
 3. The paper focuses on the post-conflict period, because, in theory at least, this site provides multiple 
opportunities for transformation on many different levels: protecting civilians, providing 
accountability for human rights violations committed during hostilities, reforming local and national 
laws, reintegrating soldiers, rehabilitating and providing redress for victims, establishing or re-
establishing the rule of law, creating human rights institutions and new governance structures, 
altering cultural attitudes, improving socioeconomic conditions, and transforming gender roles and 
women’s status. Women in the Post-Conflict Process, supra note 1, at 191. 
 4. Id. at 196–201 (noting the disparity between “mainstream[ing]” rhetoric and the reality of 
implementing this goal and asserting that SCR 1325 is focused “too narrowly (and obliquely) on 
physical security”). 
 5. Id. at 196 (“[W]omen are present during war,” participating in a number of roles; “[w]omen’s 
inclusion ought to be a raison d’etre of international involvement in conflicts and their resolution.”). 
 6. See id. at 200–01. 
 7. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Avoiding the Creation of a Gender Ghetto in International Criminal 
Law, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 655, 658 (2011) (“Responding to the growing awareness of the gendered 
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developments are the result of years of women’s rights advocacy. The U.N. SCRs, on which 
the authors’ paper focuses, are also a product of successful feminist advocacy. The SCRs 
reflect growing recognition of the central role that women must play in rebuilding 
communities torn apart by violent conflict. 
There is no doubt that SCR 13258 has ushered in some positive change. The adoption of 
SCR 1325 in 2000 was a major step forward in recognizing the important role that women 
play in peace and security.9 Its impact, however, has been limited. As the authors point out, 
the positive impact of SCR 1325 comes in a couple of different (admittedly slightly 
impoverished) forms: (1) norm development at the national level as states establish National 
Action Plans under SCR 1325 and, correspondingly, as institutional actors use the SCRs as 
organizational tools at national and sub-national levels;10 and (2) invigorated focus on gender 
that is incentivized through potential partnerships with the U.N. and donor agencies.11 
Despite its rhetorical commitment and these modest gains in national norm setting, however, 
the potential of 1325 remains largely unrealized. 
My comments will focus on what I consider to be two of the paper’s most important 
contributions (although there are many from which to choose): (1) gender centrality as a 
compelling alternative to gender mainstreaming; and (2) the authors’ skepticism toward 
defining women’s experiences in armed conflict almost exclusively in terms of victimhood. 
II.  The Limits of Gender Mainstreaming  
Gender mainstreaming is one of the core values animating SCR 1325.12 There is 
significant value in facilitating women’s access to power, allowing women to influence 
priorities for peace building, justice, and economic stability. In post-conflict situations, access 
to power includes women’s access to informal and formal structures of peace building—quite 
literally a seat at the table.13 There are, however, some limits to gender mainstreaming. This 
is particularly true when gender mainstreaming is understood in its most reductionist form—
                                                                                                                               
nature of atrocity crimes and the fact that women and girls are often targeted[,] . . . gender crimes 
were specifically included in the [International Criminal Court] Statute”). 
 8. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000). 
 9. See Carol Cohn et al., Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1325, 6 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL’Y 130, 
130 (2004) (“SC 1325 is highly significant because it is the first time the Security Council has 
devoted an entire session to debating women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations.”). 
 10. See Women in the Post-Conflict Process, supra note 1, at 206 (“NAPs may serve as norm-setting 
mechanisms” for the national level). 
 11. See id. at 201 (describing how the Security Council’s commitment to women extends “not only to 
U.N. agencies and the domestic governments that formally receive them, but to all international 
organizations contributing funds to or receiving funds for post-conflict reconstruction activities”). 
 12. See Amy Barrow, UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: Constructing Gender in Armed 
Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, 92 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 221, 229 (2010) (“Rather 
than marginalizing women’s experiences, [SCR 1325] appears to bring gender-specific concerns 
within mainstream peace and security policy considerations.”). 
 13. See UNIFEM, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN 
PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE 1 (2010) [hereinafter UNIFEM REPORT], available at 
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/0302_WomensParticipationInPeaceNegotiations_en.p
df (discussing the positive role women can play in the peace process and arguing that more should 
be done to increase women’s participation). 
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when it becomes a headcount of women.14 The 2010 U.N. Security Council Report cites the 
progress in Timor Leste as an example of successful mainstreaming in the implementation of 
SCR 1325.15 As Gina Heathcote observes, however, 
[T]he ‘measure’ of the success of Security Council initiatives on gender in Timor Leste 
through UNMIT revolves around a headcount of women in police, military and decision-
making structures that, though it might be an element of feminist demands for 
increased participation under Resolution 1325, undermines larger feminist 
understandings of the cultural construction of gender and its pervasiveness as a social 
discourse.16 
Gender mainstreaming, particularly in its most reductionist forms, moves us from a 
concern about gender (in a social constructionist sense) and the institutional structures that 
support gender subordination, to a concern about sex (in a biological essentialist sense) and 
the “women’s perspective.”17 It leaves unexamined the primary sites of feminist concern: the 
structures that support substantive gender inequalities and the cultural norms that diminish 
the value and contribution of women’s voices—even when they are at the table.18 This is why 
the authors’ alternative lens—that of gender centrality—is an important, compelling 
contribution. Although the authors recognize the significant value of getting women to the 
table, the work of gender centrality does not start or stop there.19 
In their book, On the Frontlines, the authors note that “[u]nlike what we conceptualize as 
a gender-central approach in which the equal rights and social and economic advancement of 
women are paramount, gender mainstreaming lacks both a clear critique of the gender status 
quo and a clear articulation of the substance and modalities of gender reform.”20 I share the 
authors’ skepticism of the transformative potential of gender mainstreaming.21 In the book 
and in their paper, they provide an alternative conception and, importantly, an alternative 
vocabulary for talking and thinking about real, robust gains in the achievement of 
                                                                                                                               
 14. See id. (assessing statistics on the participation of women in the peace process and concluding that it 
is “clear that at the peace table . . . women are conspicuously underrepresented”). 
 15. See Gina Heathcote, Feminist Politics and the Use of Force: Theorising Feminist Action and Security 
Council Resolution 1325, 7 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 23, 33 (2011) (citing SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, 
CROSS CUTTING REPORT NO. 2, ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 17 (Oct. 1, 2010)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in 
the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2005) (defining and giving a history of “gender 
mainstreaming” and discussing its role in international human rights efforts). 
 18. See UNIFEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 8 (using the Liberia peace talks of 2003 as an example of 
when women, though given a role with observer status, still “advocated for peace rather than 
demanding specific provisions on gender justice, which they feared would derail the process.”). 
 19. See ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 2, at 61 (arguing that gender centrality “is a necessary 
expansion: ensuring that gender matters can make a concrete difference by providing greater local 
ownership and more effective and efficient service delivery, and if well done, can actually result in 
taking the real concerns of women and men into consideration in the development of security post-
conflict”). 
 20. Id. at 14. 
 21. See id. at 13 (“[G]ender mainstreaming serves to cloak a more problematic approach of avoiding a 
systematic engagement with the causes and structures of women’s inequality. . . . [I]t perpetrates 
unnecessary gender stereotypes by intense concentration on women as victims . . . rather than on 
asking uncomfortable questions about the root causes of discrimination and exclusion.”). 
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substantive equality in the context of peace building, rather than the enervated, box-checking 
approach that gender mainstreaming often inspires.22 
In addition to its failure to challenge the structural aspects of gender subordination in the 
context of armed conflict, gender mainstreaming falls short in another important way. By 
focusing exclusively on gender, gender mainstreaming often leads to missed opportunities to 
address intersectional discrimination. Intersectionality theory recognizes that women 
experience discrimination in different, often mutually reinforcing and intersecting ways.23 
Women within a particular minority ethnic or religious group, for example, may experience 
discrimination on the basis of both gender and ethnicity or religion. Their experiences of 
discrimination are qualitatively different from the discrimination experienced by women in 
the dominant ethnic or religious group.24 As I have argued elsewhere, the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming de-emphasizes the ways in which multiple forms of discrimination may be 
simultaneously affecting women,25 particularly when gender mainstreaming is understood in 
its overly bureaucratized, “head-counting” version. 
Because a gender mainstreaming strategy focuses on integrating a gender-based analysis 
into all aspects of an institution’s work, it excludes an important analytical focal point. 
Within many institutions, such as the U.N., the exclusive focus on gender mainstreaming 
largely ignores the work of encouraging gender-based units within the institution to engage 
in systematic intersectional analysis. Gender mainstreaming fails to actively encourage 
gender-focused institutions or sub-units within an institution to explore the impact of other 
systems of oppression, such as discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, religion, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, or rural status, which operate simultaneously and in mutually 
reinforcing ways with gender subordination. 
Within the context of formal post-conflict processes, it is not sufficient to simply get women 
to the table, although this is an important step. Intersectionality theory requires that we also 
ask, “which women are sitting around the table?” Do they represent only women privileged on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or some other critical identity category? To the extent 
that they consider women’s needs at all, do negotiated agreements adequately consider the 
outcomes for different groups of women or do they treat women as an essentialized, uniform 
category? Unlike gender mainstreaming, an intersectional framework facilitates this more 
nuanced, differentiated analysis. 
Gender centrality is a compelling alternative to gender mainstreaming. It avoids the 
tendency of gender mainstreaming strategies to devolve into a process of counting women in 
order to comply with a gender mainstreaming directive. Gender centrality facilitates a deeper 
structural analysis designed to combat the underlying causes of gender subordination. 
                                                                                                                               
 22. See id. at 12 (questioning whether common gender mainstreaming strategies—which “suggest much 
action”—are transferable and “actually positively affect[] women’s lives in conflict and post-conflict 
settings”). 
 23. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).  
 24. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581 (1990).  
 25. Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of 
Women’s International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71 (2003). 
 Victimization, Mainstreaming, and the Complexity of Gender in Armed Conflict 
231 
Because it requires a more penetrating and far-reaching analysis than gender 
mainstreaming, gender centrality also comes closer to achieving a better understanding of the 
intersection of multiple forms of discrimination in women’s lives. 
III. The Limits of Victim Essentialism 
Another significant contribution of the paper is its treatment of women as complex legal 
subjects, who have agency and exercise that agency in a number of ways. Women exercise 
agency, at times, in furtherance of women’s rights and peace and, at times, in furtherance of 
violence and human rights violations. In the context of armed conflict, women are often 
defined—not as actors in the peace-building process—but one-dimensionally as victims of 
sexual assault in armed conflict.26 To varying degrees, the SCRs perpetuate this reductionist 
view of women, with 1325 and 188927 taking a slightly broader view of women’s participation 
in peace building.28 In contrast, SCR 1820 readily employs gender stereotypes that depict 
women almost exclusively as victims of sexual violence in need of protection. 
In many ways, this is a good news/bad news story. Women suffer extremely high, indeed, 
tragic levels of sexual assault. The U.N. has heard the clarion call to systematically and 
meaningfully address the needs of victims of sexual assault in armed conflict.29 That is the 
good news. In some cases, however, this urgent mandate has led to a narrow conception of 
women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict periods.30 This is, of course, the bad news. 
This narrow conception ignores several facets of gender identity, including that men are 
victims of sexual assault (albeit in smaller numbers),31 that women are soldiers,32 and play a 
variety of other roles, including as strategists and participants in peace building.33 The 
                                                                                                                               
 26. See Felicity Hill, How and When has Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and 
Security Impacted Negotiations outside the Security Council?, 23 (2005) (unpublished master thesis, 
Uppsala Univ. Programme of Int’l Studies), available at http://un1325.de/data/felicity-hill-thesis.pdf 
(noting how all speakers in the first Open Debate in the Security Council on Women, Peace and 
Security “demonstrated a greater understanding of women as victims of violence rather than agents 
in peace-building”). 
 27. S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009). 
 28. See Women in the Post-Conflict Process, supra note 1, at 200 (characterizing SCR 1889 as “unique” 
because it “extends the emphasis on women to all post-conflict phases and processes”). See also 
Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law Through the UN 
Security Council, 32 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 97, 101 (2010) (describing SCR 1325). 
 29. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 28 (noting how feminist anti-war advocates and other women’s peace and 
human rights nongovernmental organizations lobbied the Security Council to promote Resolution 
1325). 
 30. See Heathcote, supra note 15, at 31 (acknowledging that post-1325 resolutions represent progress 
but stating that they “do little to challenge the military masculinities that feminist scholarship 
challenges, neither do they effectively shift beyond the image of the women in conflict as 
predominantly under threat of sexual harm”). 
 31. See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Naomi Cahn & Dina Haynes, Masculinities and Child Soldiers in Post-
Conflict Societies, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank Rudy 
Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (emphasizing that men can also be victimized). 
 32. See ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 2, at 42–43 (describing the negative effects of “complex social 
assumptions that underplay the active roles of women in the military apparatus of the state, 
or . . . within nonstate structures in conflicted societies”). 
 33. See Sumie Nakaya, Women and Gender Equality in Peace Processes: From Women at the 
Negotiating Table to Postwar Structural Reforms in Guatemala and Somalia, 9 GLOBAL 
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authors of the paper, and others like Dianne Otto, have raised concern about the exclusive 
focus on women as victims of sexual assault in the context of armed conflict.34 
There are a number of problems with this one-dimensional approach to women’s identity 
in the context of armed conflict. This oversimplification creates a form of essentialism that 
equates women’s experience of armed conflict with sexual assault.35 When women are defined 
solely as victims, women’s experience is valued as long as it correlates with the experience of 
victimhood. Women may, therefore, be invited to weigh in on matters concerning women’s 
physical safety but little else. The focus on victimization acts as a constraint on discourse. 
Victim essentialism limits women’s discursive space in several ways. First, when women 
are defined exclusively, or even primarily, as victims of sexual violence, they are perceived as 
lacking agency. As non-agenic members of the community, they are unable to actively 
participate in reimagining or rebuilding the community. Second, when women are equated 
with sexualized victims, they are often consulted on matters related to sexual violence. The 
terrain of sexual violence represents the discursive territory that women are allowed to 
occupy. 
In the limited context of sexual violence, women are often consulted (although, as the 
authors point out, they are not always asked the right questions).36 The parameters of 
consultation, however, are limited by this narrow conception of women as victims. Indeed, the 
Secretary General’s 2009 report on the implementation of SCR 1325 states that “women 
continue to be considered as victims and not as key partners in addressing and resolving 
situations of armed conflict.”37 Because women are reduced to their experiences of 
victimization, this obviates the need to consult and defer on the broader issues related to 
peace building.38 
In its report, From Resolution to Reality: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Uganda on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Governance, CARE 
                                                                                                                               
GOVERNANCE 459 (2003) (discussing women’s participation in the peace process through two case 
studies: Guatemala and Somalia). 
 34. See Otto, supra note 28, at 117 (“The Security Council could have remained faithful to the more 
liberating representations of women it embraced in R1325 by crediting women with agency in the 
face of sexual violence and questioning the inevitability of their powerlessness.”). 
 35. For a general definition of “essentialism,” see Heathcote, supra note 15, at 37 (defining 
“essentialism” as “referring to the central question in feminist thinking on how to engage and 
develop a project on ‘women’ without reducing understanding of human diversity and difference”). 
Heathcote uses the term “victim essentialism” resulting from the prevalence of reference to women 
as requiring protection from sexual violence. Id. at 38. 
 36. See Women in the Post-Conflict Process, supra note 1, at 193–94 (describing how the framing of a 
question can affect the response). 
 37. U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 68, U.N. 
Doc. S/2009/465 (Sept. 16, 2009). 
 38. See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Women, Security, and the Patriarchy of Internationalized Transitional 
Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 1055, 1066 (2009) (discussing how post-conflict focus on physical security, 
“often conflating physical security with narrowly defined sexual security for women,” can have 
“decisively negative implications for women . . . [which] affects broader understandings of what 
issues are open for negotiation, mediation, and reform purposes, and what kinds of institutional 
reforms ought to follow”). 
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International examines the impact of SCR 1325 over the last decade.39 The report quotes an 
official at the Juba Peace Secretariat, who states: “In spite of their differences the women 
were consistent and persistent with their issues. They talked as victims and demanded the 
rights of abducted women to be protected.”40 I worry about the limited discursive space that 
women have been allowed. This official of the Juba Peace Secretariat referred to issues 
related to women’s abduction (and implicitly sexual assault) as “their issues.” According to 
this official, women talked “as victims” and demanded “protection.” Whether or not the 
women talked as victims, they were certainly heard “as victims.” This is but one example; I 
suspect that it is replicated many times over in areas of conflict and peace building. 
There is an implicit notion that women have limited expertise—tragically an expertise 
born of widespread sexual violence—but that any meaningful contributions (and therefore, 
consultations) will be limited to that experience of sexual assault.41 In this narrative of 
woman as victim, women do not, as a result, have the ability to weigh in on their most urgent 
needs if those needs fall outside of the parameters of sexual violence. This limited discursive 
space has harmful consequences for women when at least some of their most pressing needs 
are never heard and therefore never met. 
The exclusive focus on sexual violence also de-emphasizes other critical concerns among 
women, such as socio-economic needs.42 The authors note that although some of the women 
who were raped “felt profoundly stigmatized by the sexual violence” done to many of them, 
“they prioritized [the] ‘return to their villages, to regain their livelihoods and the daily 
routines that gave their lives dignity and purpose.’ ”43 When institutional actors consult 
women about their most pressing concerns and women report concerns other than those 
related to sexual violence, those concerns are not always heard. Women’s articulated 
“immediate priorities [such as] ‘food insecurity,’ or returning home”44 fall outside of the 
discursive space carved out for women in the larger dialogue concerning peace-building and 
post-conflict processes. 
Financial incentives are powerful tools. In the post-conflict process, donor agencies have 
considerable influence over the work that happens on the ground. Donors have focused on 
                                                                                                                               
 39. CARE INTERNATIONAL, FROM RESOLUTION TO REALITY: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN, 
NEPAL AND UGANDA ON WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACEBUILDING AND POST-CONFLICT 
GOVERNANCE (2010). 
 40. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
 41. See Pamela Scully, Vulnerable Women: A Critical Reflection on Human Rights Discourse and Sexual 
Violence, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 113, 119–20 (2009) (arguing that language labeling women as 
vulnerable and requiring sexual protection can undermine the goal of inclusion in the peace 
process—“How do vulnerable women who need protection morph into the strong leaders who will 
help shape new terrains of liberty and security?”). 
 42. See Aoláin, supra note 38, at 1075 (noting the relationship between disarmament and security 
includes sexual security for women, but that a “broader concept of gender security . . . may be 
advanced when disarmament is entwined with economic distribution and political representation” 
and noting with disappointment that any attention given to this issue is “specialized” rather than a 
mainstream practice). 
 43. Women in the Post-Conflict Process, supra note 1, at 209 (citing PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
NOWHERE TO TURN: FAILURE TO PROTECT, SUPPORT AND ASSURE JUSTICE FOR DARFURI WOMEN, at 
iii (2009)). 
 44. Id. at 210. 
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sexual violence programs, sometimes at the expense of other worthy programs that would 
more directly respond to women’s articulated, pressing needs—such as food and 
resettlement.45 Although the authors speculate about possible causes of this donor myopia,46 
it is difficult to determine why projects aimed at combating sexual violence have so 
completely overshadowed projects designed to meet women’s other basic needs. This is yet 
another dimension of the good news/bad news story. Donor attention to the problem of sexual 
violence in armed conflict represents a hard-fought victory for women’s human rights 
advocates. The price, however, cannot be donor blindness to the wide array of critical needs 
among women in areas affected by armed conflict. 
The focus on women as victims also leaves little room for men who are victims of sexual 
violence in armed conflict. Victim essentialism constructs victimhood in feminine terms; it 
equates womanhood with sexual victimization. It also leaves little room for female 
perpetrators of sexual violence. Male victims and female perpetrators fall outside of gender 
stereotyped roles. Although not situated in a post-conflict setting, the example of prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib is, nevertheless, illustrative.47 
The sexual abuse of male Iraqi prisoners by U.S. service members at Abu Ghraib was 
designed to feminize and humiliate the detainees. Sexual victimization is culturally coded as 
female.48 In this case, the abuse, which included sexual abuse, the forced wearing of women’s 
underwear, and forced and simulated same-sex sexual contact, was intended to femininize, or 
emasculate the enemy.49 Feminization of the enemy reinforces social hierarchies by equating 
masculinity and heterosexuality with superiority and the ability to inflict abuse. The abuse 
thus reinforced social hierarchies based on gender, ethnicity, and heterosexuality.50 
Some of the most high-profile perpetrators of the Abu Ghraib abuse were women. Lynndie 
England, Sabrina Harmon, and Megan Ambuhl represented a conceptual disconnect in the 
national narrative.51 Women were supposed to be victims—not perpetrators—of sexual 
abuse. The media coverage suggests that the nation struggled to make sense of the notion of 
women as perpetrators.52 Because these female perpetrators did not fit their prescribed 
gender roles, they were construed as deviants within the national narrative. 
The female perpetrators of the Abu Ghraib abuse as well as the high-profile prosecutions 
of female perpetrators at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR)53 underscore the notion that women exercise agency in the 
                                                                                                                               
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 209–10. 
 47. See Johanna Bond, A Decade after Abu Ghraib: Lessons in “Softening Up” the Enemy and Sex-Based 
Humiliation, 31 LAW & INEQ. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the gendered dynamics of the Abu 
Ghraib abuse scandal). 
 48. Id. (manuscript at 11). 
 49. Id. (manuscript at 12). 
 50. Id. (manuscript at 17–18). 
 51. See id. (manuscript at 21–26) (discussing the women prosecuted for abuses at Abu Ghraib).  
 52. Id. (manuscript at 24–25).  
 53. See Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509, 520 
(2003). 
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commission of sexual violence in armed conflict, although in smaller numbers than men.54 As 
Kelly Askin notes, “women are increasingly recognized as actors, enablers, and even 
perpetrators, instead of simply as victims, of wartime violence.”55 The exclusive focus on 
women as victims of sexual violence undermines women’s agency and fails to fully capture 
women’s participation in times of conflict.56 
IV.  Conclusion 
Among other important contributions, the authors’ paper challenges the exclusive focus on 
women as victims of sexual violence in armed conflict, simultaneously recognizing that 
women face tragic levels of gender-based violence, both during and post-conflict—and that the 
experience of sexual victimization does not reflect the complexity of women’s identity or the 
range of potential contributions to the peace-building process.57 
The paper explores the untapped potential of SCR 1325 and its progeny. In so doing, it 
offers us a framework in the form of gender centrality through which to measure real gains in 
substantive equality rather than formal equality. It also offers a more nuanced 
understanding of women’s experience and expertise in armed conflict and peace building. 
Finally, the paper offers insight into closing the gap between the potential of the SCRs and 
the reality on the ground, namely using funding (and, relatedly, partnering relationships) to 
incentivize national organizing around and implementation of these critical resolutions.58 
  
                                                                                                                               
55.  See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, “She Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Woman”: The Genocide Conviction of 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2013). 
 55. Askin, supra note 53, at 513. 
 56. Bond, supra note 47 (manuscript at 29). 
 57. Women in the Post-Conflict Process, supra note 1, at 207–08 (“we do not endorse the insertion of 
women into government positions . . . in the absence of other measures promoting women’s political, 
social, and economic capital . . .”). 
 58. See id. at 215–16 (“Wherever the U.N. operates, so do multiple other international and regional 
actors, committed . . . to working as part of (or partner to, or in concert with, or as recipients of) U.N. 
field operations. . . . The U.N. field operations are mandated to implement [the Security Council 
resolutions], and as a consequence, other international actors and donors also adopt and implement 
the principles articulated within them.”). 
